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    Some industries need physical or virtual networks to provide their products and 
services. In economics we call them network industries. Dynamic efficiency of 
competition is rather important in those industries. Regulation of network industries 
should not only aim at insuring that today’s consumers face a broad variety of 
products at competitive prices but also aim to insure that future consumers will be 
served properly.  
    This paper first examines the features of network competition and various 
meanings of dynamic efficiency using industrial organization theory. Then we 
review the literature of network competition and dynamic efficiency. At last we 
develop a network competition model with investment and network externalities, 
using the telecommunication industry as an example. We use Ramsey sub-optimum 
as the social welfare benchmark, in which the price structure stands for static 
efficiency and investment level stands for dynamic efficiency. We examine these two 
efficiencies under competitive equilibrium and the influence of access pricing rule as 
well as network externality intensity and network substitutability. Our findings 
indicate that, there exists an “ideal equilibrium state”, in which competitive 
equilibriums could provide enough innovations without loss of static welfare of 
consumers. In this situation network externalities are just intensive enough to offset 
the negative externalities of quality investment. Thus industry profit is positive while 
both consumer and operator welfare reach social optimum. Static efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency no longer conflicts with each other. On the contrary they could 
be gained simultaneously. What the regulators need to do in this situation is merely 
to set access charge at cost. However the restrictions on “ideal equilibrium state” are 
rarely satisfied in many network industries. Then the regulators have to balance 
between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency and use well-designed regulation 














    In a word, this paper combines two different sources of literature, i.e. network 
competition and network externalities. We develop a canonical model to study static 
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或者实行国有。然而垄断和管制有其自身的效率损失，从 20 世纪 70 年代以来，
许多国家开始对网络型产业施行放松管制，引入竞争的政策。 
    对于网络型产业而言，竞争的动态效率尤为重要。网络型产业监管的目标
不只是让今天的消费者以竞争性的价格获得众多种类的产品和服务，而且还要





    目前，中国的网络型产业的改革已经开始，有的产业如电信业已经初步搭
建起了竞争的平台，规制改革正在逐步深入，有关的竞争和规制问题也引起了
国内理论和实业界的激烈讨论。 
    在这一背景下，本文以电信网络为例，试图研究网络型产业中的竞争性均
衡如何达到，其静态效率和动态效率如何，一些规制政策又如何影响这两种效
率。 






























    第三章为文献综述，梳理了三类理论文献，包括网络外部性文献、网络竞
争文献和动态效率文献，以及一些实证和经验研究文献，试图得出产业组织理
论有关网络竞争和动态效率研究成果的一个清晰图景。 




   第五章总结了模型分析所得出的一些结论，指出了它们的政策含义，并就模
型的可能创新之处和局限性作了一些说明。 

























图 2-1 用一个简单的星形电话网展现了这些特征。一个从 A 到 B 的电话呼









图 2-1 一个简单的星形电话交换网 
 














若 AB 和 BA 是两个不同的服务，则称网络是双向的（Economides 和 White 


























n ( 1n n + )
网络外部性出现的关键原因是网络组件的互补性。在不同的网络中，外部
















电话交换网，这个网络有 个节点， 种不同的潜在产品，第( )个
消费者给网络中的 个已有用户带来直接的网络外部性是通过向网络增加互补
性连接，提供了2 种新的潜在产品，扩大了已有消费者的选择范围。 
n ( 1n n − ) 1n +
n
n
    在典型的单向网络中，外部性是间接的。假设网络中有 种 A 组件和 种
B 组件，则潜在的复合产品有 种。一个额外的用户给其他用户带来间接的网



























































Ramsey-Boiteux 定价，它 初是由 Frank Ramsey 在一篇 优征税理论的文章
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